This case concerned the attempt to enforce an arbitrator`s decision in relation to a dispute concerning planning and other services provided in connection with construction work at Sumburgh Airport in Shetland. The arbitrator`s decision awarded him a significant payment. Defence counsel wished to oppose the enforcement of this decision and thus the payment on the ground that the arbitrator had rendered his decision in violation of the rules of natural justice, so that the decision was not enforceable. However, the prosecutor argued that defence counsel approved the arbitrator`s decision by his conduct. This was done on the grounds that, after the decision under the contract was rendered, defence counsel had formally informed of his dissatisfaction with the decision and his intention to refer the dispute to an arbitral tribunal for final decision. Doctrine has often been raised around the issue of legal rights, where a beneficiary of a will had to decide whether to receive a bequest or invoke his or her legal rights. As regards the exercise of statutory rights by accepting inheritance, it has been replaced by section 13 of the Succession (Scotland) Act 1964. However, there remains a place for doctrine in Scottish inheritance law. For example, heirs to a will in Bruce`s Judicial Factor v Lord Advocate [1969] S.C. 296 had difficulty asserting the invalidity of the revocation clause in the will without approving the rest of the deed. Although the case was decided on the basis of other considerations, Lord Judge-Registrar (Grant) referred to the doctrine in a manner which suggested that its application was appropriate in the present case (ibid., p. 306, where he notes that he did not see how the claimants could overcome “the obstacle of approval and disapproval”).

In Scotland, this term is used to mean that you can agree and disagree. This is a maxim quod approbo non reprobo. For example, if a testator gives his property to A and the property from A to B, A is not free to approve the will to the extent that he receives the inheritance and rejects it in relation to the inheritance of his property to B, in other words, he cannot approve and reject the will. Essentially, the doctrine is about preventing inconsistent behavior and ensuring a just outcome. Let`s look at some of the landmark decisions in India that clarify the scope of the doctrine of approval and disapproval. The first category of “choice” goes even further and includes situations that involve contradictory behavioral procedures, but without reference to a document. For example, in Express Newspapers plc v News (UK) Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1320, the applicant put forward an argument in the appeal and an adversarial argument in the counterclaim. They were deemed unable to do so by applying the principles of consent and rejection in the election. Similarly, the plaintiff in Redworth Construction Ltd v.

Brookdale Healthcare Ltd [2006] EWHC 1994 (TCC) sought to invoke a case before a tribunal other than that submitted to the arbitrator in the previous decision. It was found that they could not approve and reject their previous argument. The approach in these two cases could be seen as a contradiction to the tradition in Scottish courts` demands to avoid alternative cases (esto) that conflict with each other and often allow for a plea to “eat and eat your cake”. The Supreme Court held that the party questioning the arbitrator`s jurisdiction to rule on the counterclaims had in fact invited the arbitrator to rule on those counterclaims could not take such a position. It applied the doctrine of approval and rejection, ruling that once a party invites an arbitrator to rule on certain claims, that party cannot contradict itself and say that the arbitrator is not authorized to decide those issues. He also noted that a party cannot approve and reject, is a principle enshrined in almost all forms of civil jurisdiction and is also committed to arbitration. Accordingly, the General Court did not consider it useful on that point and dismissed the appeal accordingly. In the case of Thacker Hariram Motiram v. Balkrishan Chatrabhu Thacker[3], the High Court gave the appellant (tenant) one year to rule on the second appeal in an eviction case, provided that he agreed to renounce free possession within three weeks within the above-mentioned period.